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BOOK REVIEW
VIRGINIA LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY. By Gary Spahn and Robert
Draim. GA.: Harrison Company, 1990. 321 pages. $74.95.
Reviewed by Thomas W. Williamson, Jr.*
When the history of Twentieth Century America's jurisprudence
is chronicled, a prominent chapter will be devoted to the rise of
product liability law. At the beginning of the century, a person in-
jured by a defective product usually had no recourse against either
the product's seller or manufacturer. By 1970, the barriers ob-
structing recovery had been dismantled and it was generally ac-
cepted that a seller or manufacturer of a product would be strictly
liable to anyone injured by the defective condition of the product.
Several factors account for this imposition of liability onto prod-
uct manufacturers and sellers. First and foremost, the abrogation
of the requirement that the injured person be in privity of contract
with the product seller dramatically broadened the scope of liabil-
ity by permitting any user of a product or any "bystander" injured
by the product to recover for harm inflicted by the product. Con-
currently with the fall of privity, the doctrine of strict liability
arose from the common law of warranty. Strict liability eliminated
the onerous burden of proving that the defendant was negligent in
distributing a defective product.
In addition to the substantive changes in the law of product lia-
bility, procedural changes have also affected the product liability
plaintiff. Adoption of liberal discovery rules has given the plaintiff
access to the files and employees of the manufacturer. The broad-
ening breadth of personal jurisdiction and the ensuing enactment
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of long arm statutes require a manufacturer and seller to defend
cases in states far removed from their base of operations. Increas-
ing judicial acceptance of expert testimony and the bar's enterprise
in locating and presenting effective expert witnesses have en-
hanced the plaintiff's ability to prove that a product defect caused
the mishap which injured the plaintiff.
Virginia participated in the product liability revolution. Yet, the
path chosen by Virginia diverged from the one chosen by most
other states. The vast majority of states adopted the doctrine of
strict liability in tort. Justice Traynor, in writing the opinion
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,1 drew upon the common
law of warranty to create a rule that one who placed a product in
the stream of commerce was strictly liable for any harm caused by
the product. In 1965, section 402(A) Restatement (Second) of
Torts adopted Greenman and made clear that, unlike warranty,
strict liability in tort could not be disclaimed by a product seller,
and lack of privity would be no defense.
Virginia has never made the leap from warranty principles of the
law of sales to a free standing tort remedy of strict liability. Con-
tractual issues such as disclaimer continue to cloud the Virginia
plaintiff's efforts to impose strict liability on the purveyors of de-
fective products. This distinction, as well as Virginia's stubborn re-
fusal to adopt comparative fault in negligence actions, creates a
unique environment in Virginia for product liability litigation. As a
result, a special need has existed for a product liability treatise
specifically addressing Virginia law on the subject.
Virginia Law of Products Liability authored by Gary Spahn and
Robert Draim ably fills this void. Spahn and Draim, who are both
experienced in the defense of product liability claims in Virginia,
have produced a primer which is both user friendly and thorough.
It addresses not only the substantive law but also the procedural
and evidentiary issues which recur frequently in product liability
actions. These issues include the admissibility of post-accident
product modifications and recalls, personal jurisdiction, successor
liability, and offensive collateral estoppel.
The discussion of the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel
bears special comment. Virginia strictly adheres to the require-
ment of mutuality of parties thus effectively preventing application
1. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962).
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of offensive collateral estoppel. The authors alert the practitioner
to the choice of law rules which may require a court in Virginia to
preclude a defendant from relitigating issues determined adversely
to the party in a jurisdiction which has adopted the doctrine of
offensive collateral estoppel.
Whenever lawyers write books, the danger exists that the litiga-
tion stance of their clients will color the presentation. Spahn and
Draim largely avoided this pitfall and have produced an objective,
neutral analysis of the status of product liability law in Virginia. In
only a few instances, can one question the authors' exposition of
the state of the law in Virginia.
Relying on Featherall v. Firestone,2 the authors erroneously sug-
gest that the implied warranty of merchantability requires a prod-
uct to be reasonably fit only for intended use and "reasonably fore-
seeable appropriate uses" but not reasonably foreseeable misuses
of the product. Featherall does not support the suggested three
part dichotomy. Instead, Featherall holds that warranty liability
will be imposed if the product is unreasonably dangerous either for
the use to which it "would ordinarily be put or some other reasona-
bly foreseeable purpose."3 Warranty liability will be absent when
"there has been an unforeseen misuse of the product."4 In White
Consolidated Industry v. Swiney,5 the Supreme Court of Virginia
again clearly announced that misuse is a defense to a warranty
claim only when it is an "unforeseen misuse. ' '6
Spahn and Draim devote considerable effort to discussing what
they label "the knowledgeable purchaser" defense to a failure to
warn claim. Drawing upon Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co.,7 the au-
thors contend that if the purchaser has knowledge of a product's
design or dangers, the product supplier has no duty to warn the
nonpurchaser of a product. This defense is frequently asserted in
the context of a sophisticated employer who purchases a product
for the use of employees who may have little knowledge of the
product's hazards.
Spahn and Draim downplay the critical factor in whether the
2. 219 Va. 949, 252 S.E.2d 458 (1979).
3. Id. at 965, 252 S.E.2d at 367.
4. Id. at 966, 252 S.E.2d at 367.
5. 237 Va. 23, 376 S.E.2d 283 (1989).
6. Id. at 29, 376 S.E.2d at 286 (quoting Featherall v. Firestone, 219 Va. 949, 964, 252
S.E.2d 358, 367 (1979)).
7. 623 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1980).
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knowledge of a purchaser will be a viable defense to the failure to
warn claim of an injured user employed by the purchaser: Was it
feasible to directly warn the nonpurchaser user? In Marshall, the
product was a complex industrial system which had been designed
and constructed with the participation of the purchaser-employer's
engineers. A direct warning to the employees operating the system
was unfeasible, and no duty to warn was imposed on the
manufacturer.
When the product is a less sprawling and more self-contained
unit (of the type involved in most product liability cases), the re-
sult is different. For example, in Willis v. Raymark Indus., Inc.,8
the knowledgeable purchaser defense asserted by an asbestos man-
ufacturer was rejected where it was not unduly burdensome to
have placed warnings on the product itself.
One of the strengths of Spahn and Draims's treatise is its avoid-
ance of merely being a parochial review of the substantive law of
Virginia. The authors are cognizant of the advancing federalization
of products liability law. Accordingly, Spahn and Draim give the
reader succinct discussions of federal preemption and its offspring,
the government contractor defense. Due to the vast panoply of fed-
eral regulatory schemes, a multitude of products are the subject of
federal regulation. This may provide grist for an assertion that a
jury determination under state law that a product is defective
would be preempted by federal law.
The clamor loudest heard today in the product liability arena is
to cast aside completely the role of states in fashioning the rights
of persons injured by products to recover damages from the prod-
uct manufacturers and sellers. Legislative proposals to this effect
are under active consideration by Congress.' However, until federal
legislation completely supplants the state law in the balancing of
rights and liabilities between product suppliers and persons in-
jured by products, Spahn and Draims's Virginia Law of Products
Liability will be a valuable reference work for any attorney in-
volved in Virginia product liability litigation.
8. 905 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1990).
9. S. 640, 102J Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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